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THE PRUDENTIAL CARVE-OUT CLAUSE:
IS RISK THE NEW CORRUPT MORAL?
John Anwesen*

This Article presents the first analysis of the WTO panel report in Argentina – Measures
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, the first decision interpreting one of the most
controversial clauses in the General Agreement on Trade in Services – the prudential carve-out
clause. Prudential carve-out clause has been a matter of controversy ever since the Uruguay
Round of Negotiations, when the text was adopted, and remains a matter of debate decades
after. The panel report in Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services,
issued in September of 2015, clarified that national measures violating free trade commitments
need not be “prudential” and only the reasons for those measures must. However, the panel’s
interpretation of the word “prudential” as “preventative” or “precautionary” raises questions.
Panel’s interpretation left this word essentially powerless.
This Article takes on the task of interpreting the prudential carve-out clause following relatively
more of a mechanical framework utilized by the Appellate Body in United States – Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services. The Appellate Body in
that case used Vienna Convention’s rules of treaty interpretation. Following Vienna
Convention tools of treaty interpretation, this Article proposes that “prudential,” while
remaining vague, conveys some sort of a reasonableness standard. After the recent international
financial crisis, as countries increasingly engage in regulations of the financial services sector,
challenges to such regulations are becoming more likely. Therefore, a close examination of the
prudential-carve out clause may help the regulators, potential challengers, and WTO dispute
settlement bodies better understand what may or may not be a permissible regulation affecting
the international supply of financial services.
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of Law. Many thanks to Michael P. Van Alstine. This Article could not have
been completed without his continuous support and guidance. Also, special
thanks to H. Deen Kaplan for helpful thoughts and comments on the research
process of this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Horace (65-8 B.C.), the Roman lyric poet, in Odes says: “The
sea brought contact with strangers who could disrupt domestic life by
exposing citizens to the bad manners and corrupt morals of
barbarians.”1
The Great Financial Crisis, which officially started in
December of 2007, affected virtually all countries around the globe.2
The collapse in international trade due to the Financial Crisis was
“exceptional by historical standards.”3 There are many arguments
about what caused or contributed to the Financial Crisis. Certainly it
is difficult to point to one or several causes in a complex world of
voluminous interconnected economic transactions. If the task is to
avoid a financial crisis, one will inevitably be required to consider the
past causes. However, if one accepts that financial crises are
inevitable because of many causes, then the task becomes how to
contain a potential future crisis—instead of trying to avoid it. If one
of the aspirations and objectives for promoting liberalized
international trade is world peace—countries depending on each
other through trade are less likely to be involved in direct conflicts—
such dependency has its downside when one economic sector of one
country collapses and pulls various world economies into a
downward-spiral. It is no secret that a closed, isolated economy
would be immune to international economic crises, but that economy
will forgo all of the benefits of liberalized trade during times of
prosperity.

DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE 12 (1996).
BUSINES CYCLE DATING COMMITTEE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DETERMINATION OF DECEMBER 2007 PEAK IN
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 2 (2008).
3
Andrei A. Levchenko, Logan T. Lewis & Linda L. Tesar, Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, The Collapse of International Trade During the 2008-2009 Crisis 1
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16006, 2010) (“Relative to
economic activity, the drop in trade is an order of magnitude larger than what was
observed in the previous postwar recessions, with the exception of 2001. The
collapse appears to be broad-based across trading partners: trade with virtually all
parts of the world fell by double digits.”).
1
2
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Although the days of Horace are long gone and trade may no
longer expose citizens to “bad manners and corrupt morals,” trade in
financial services may expose them to financial risks. The question
then becomes how a country would reap the benefits of liberalized
international trade and protect its citizens from the risk of potential
financial crises. While countries may attempt reducing toxic risk
exposure in the area of financial services, such attempts may violate
various World Trade Organization (“WTO”) commitments.
However, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”)
provides an avenue for countries to claim an exception under the
prudential carve-out clause. This exception has been long subject to
controversy ever since the negotiations on the text began, because
negotiators attempted to strike the right balance between free trade
and the national right to regulate—an issue that remains unresolved.
Part II of this Article will introduce the historical
development of the GATS to show the complexity of the
negotiations.
Part III will introduce the GATS structure and summarize
some of its parts to give relevant general background information.
Part II will point out some of the other GATS exceptions because
the reasoning for those exceptions will be useful for limiting the
scope of the prudential carve-out clause, as discussed in Part V.
Part IV will introduce the prudential carve-out clause and
summarize a recent WTO panel report that interpreted parts of the
clause for the first time, adopting a three-prong legal standard. One
of the prongs of the legal standard is a requirement that measures
must be “prudential,” meaning “preventative” or “precautionary,” as
interpreted by the panel.
Part V will analyze the panel report and argue that panel’s
interpretation of “prudential” is overly broad in some sense and
could lead to absurd regulations. To do so, Part V will follow
previous WTO Appellate Body decisions which utilized treaty
interpretation rules of the Vienna Convention. This Part will propose
that “prudential” should have some determination of reasonableness
which the panel report did not require. Further, Part V will argue that
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the broad scope of the prudential carve-out clause is narrowed by the
existence of other exceptions in the GATS.
Part VI will conclude.
II. GATS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”) was drafted in the Second World War’s aftermath by
delegates of many countries during 1946-47 and signed on 30
October 1947.4 For almost a half-century since GATT entered into
force in 1948, it did not get much attention from international
diplomats and lawyers, except for international trade enthusiasts,
because the main focus of the times was the Cold War.5 However,
GATT eventually led to the birth of the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) in 1995.6 The Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (“WTO Agreement”) contains four Annexes, the first
item in the Annexes (Annex 1A) is “GATT 1947”—now known as
“GATT 1994.”7 GATT essentially governs trade in goods,8 while the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1B to the WTO
Agreement, deals with services.9 While GATT existed for over a halfcentury, GATS is relatively a new agreement. Services were not
always conceived as being internationally tradeable. This conceptual
shift about services occurred in the early 1970s and mid-1980s—
from services as non-tradeable to services as tradeable.10 Business
pressure was one variable which caused the conceptual change
among countries towards the idea that services could be traded
internationally by private enterprises.11 For example, the American
RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 5-7 (3d ed. 2007).
Id. at 7.
6
Id. at 8.
7
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
8
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
9
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS].
10 BHALA, supra note 4, at 1541-42.
11 Id. at 1542.
4
5
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financial service sector (e.g., American Insurance Group (AIG),
American Express, Bank of America, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, J.P.
Morgan, and Merrill Lynch) saw expansion opportunities to countries
with emerging middle classes and began lobbying for removal of
trade barriers with respect to services.12
GATS was a product of complex 1986-93 Uruguay Round of
negotiations and was not finalized until 1994.13 GATS negotiations
were described as “sector-by-sector—tortuous, inch-by-inch, as it
were.”14 One factor contributing to the difficulties encountered
during negotiations was that because of the way services are traded,
GATS trade liberalization provisions had to extend further into postborder measures when compared to GATT provisions.15 Another
contributing factor to the complexity was how commitments under
GATS were made.16 GATS commitments are generally classified into
general and specific, where specific commitments apply only to
specific service sectors and sub-sectors to which a WTO member
(“Member”) has committed to; moreover, the specific sectors and
sub-sectors are further narrowed by one or more of four modes of
supplies through which that service may be supplied.17 Even after the
Uruguay Round was completed and the basic GATS text was
finalized, significant trade liberalization commitments were made
through Members’ schedules of specific commitments.18
Negotiations for market access commitments in the area of
financial services were extended to June 30, 1995 and later extended

12
Id. at 1542-43 (“No GATT contracting party wanted services trade
liberalization on the agenda of any new round of multilateral trade negotiation
more than the U.S.”).
13
Id. at 1539.
14
BHALA, supra note 4, at 1549.
15
Id. at 1541 (“In general, trade in services involves much more behindthe-border regulation than does trade in goods.”).
16
Id. at 1539.
17
See id. at 1578-91.
18
See id. at 1540 (citing WTO, Second Protocol to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, S/L/11 (July 24, 1995); WTO, Third Protocol to the General Agreement
on Trade in Services, S/L/12 (July 24, 1995); WTO, Fourth Protocol to the General
Agreement on Trade in Services, S/L/20 (Apr. 30, 1996); WTO, Fifth Protocol to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services, S/L/45 (Dec. 3, 1997)).

753

2016

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

4:2

by another month.19 Negotiations took place in the middle of the
Asian economic crisis which could have been used by countries such
as Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand as an excuse
not to liberalize the trade in financial services.20 However, instead the
Asian leaders agreed that Newly Industrialized Countries and Least
Developed Countries would benefit from liberalization perhaps
because it would permit cheaper financial capital flow into the
markets of those countries.21 Then on December 12, 1997 an
agreement on financial services commitments was made which
covers a substantial portion of trade in banking, securities, insurance
and financial information.22
III. GATS SUMMARY
GATS is composed of the Preamble, six separate parts to the
Agreement, and followed by Annexes. One of these Annexes is the
Annex on Financial Services. Part I of the GATS deals with the
scope by, inter alia, defining trade in services through modes of
supply.23 Part II relates to general commitments.24 Part III relates to
specific commitments.25 Part IV covers negotiations, schedules of
specific commitments, and modifications of those schedules.26 Part V
contains institutional provisions such as the dispute settlement and
enforcement.27 Part VI mainly contains definitions and states that the
Annexes are an integral part of the agreement.28 Without going into
all of the GATS details, few segments of it are important for
purposes of this Article: the Preamble, four modes of supply, general
commitments, specific commitments, exceptions from commitments,
and dispute settlement.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

BHALA, supra note 4, at 1581.
Id. at 1581-82.
Id. at 1582.
Id. at 1581.
GATS, supra note 9, art. I.2.
See generally id. art. II-XV.
See generally id. art. XVI-XVIII.
See generally id. art. XIX-XXI.
See generally id. art. XXII-XVI.
See generally id. art. XXVII-XXVII.

754

2016

Anwesen

4:2

A. GATS Preamble
The Preamble to GATS recognizes seven important
objectives and considerations: (1) importance of trade in services for
the growth and development of world economy, (2) economic
growth through expansion of trade under the conditions of
transparency and progressive liberalization, (3) liberalization through
successive rounds of multilateral negotiations aimed at promoting the
interests of all participants while giving due respect to national policy
objectives, (4) recognizing the general right of Members to regulate,
and more specifically, introduce regulation on the supply of services
within their territories in order to meet national policy objectives, (5)
development of developing countries, (6) facilitate increasing
participation of developing countries in trade in services, (7) special
economic situation and economic development of least-developed
countries.29
B. Four Modes of Supply
Trade in services is defined in an unusual way. Instead of
saying what trade in services is, GATS defines the trade in services
through how the supply of service is performed. There are four ways
in which a service can be supplied—the four modes of supply: (1)
“from the territory of one Member, into the territory of any other
Member,” i.e. cross-border supply, for example providing customer
services from one country to the customers of a company in another
country; (2) “in the territory of one Member to the service consumer
of any other Member,” i.e. consumption abroad, for example a
tourist consuming the services of a guide abroad, (3) “by a service
supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the
territory of any other Member,” i.e. commercial presence, for
example a branch operating abroad that provides banking services to
consumers abroad, (4) “by a service supplier of one Member, through
presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other

See GATS, supra note 9, Preamble; cf. BHALA, supra note 4, at 1569
(In an attempt to avoid overlapping statements, objectives are stated and organized
in a different manner in this Article.).
29
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Member,” i.e. temporary movement of natural persons, for example a
visiting professor teaching abroad.30
C. General Commitments
Commitments under GATS are categorized into general and
specific.31 General commitments are the minimum obligations that
apply across the board to all sectors and sub-sectors of supplied
services.32 General commitments in GATS Part II are: the Most
Favored Nation treatment (“MFN”) under Article II, and
Transparency under Article III of GATS.33 MFN treatment requires
any treatment which a Member accords to like services and service
supplies of any other country to be immediately and unconditionally
accorded to the other Members’ service suppliers.34 In other words,
when two countries liberalize trade among each other and one of
them is a Member, any favorable treatment related to service supply
granted by the Member is automatically multilateralized for all
Members.35 Finally, Article III contains transparency commitments
related to “all relevant measures of general application which pertain
to or affect the operation of [GATS].”36
D. Specific Commitments
Specific commitments in GATS Part III cover mainly two
topics: National Treatment and Market Access.37 According to GATS
Part III, a Member may make market access and/or national
treatment commitments in specific sectors (sub-sectors or sub-subsectors) of supplied services; moreover, a Member can also specify

30
31
32

GATS, supra note 9, art. I; see also BHALA, supra note 4, at 1546-48.
See GATS, supra note 9, Table of Contents.
See GATS, supra note 9, art. II.1, III.1; see also BHALA, supra note 4,

at 1578.
33
34

GATS, supra note 9, art. II, III.
See GATS, supra note 9, art. II; see also BHALA, supra note 4, at 1579-

82.
35

See GATS, supra note 9, art. II; see also BHALA, supra note4, at 1562-

36

GATS, supra note 9, art. III.
See id. art. XVI, XVII.

63.
37
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the mode(s) of supply to which such commitment(s) are applicable
to.38
Once a Member makes specific market-access
commitment(s), unless the specific commitment(s) provide otherwise,
Member may not impose: (1) “limitations on the number of service
suppliers,” (2) “limitations on the total value of service transactions
or assets,” (3) “limitations on total number of service operations or
on the total quantity of service output,” (4) “limitations on the total
number of natural persons that may be employed,” (5) measures that
restrict or require a particular form of legal entity organization, (f)
limitations on foreign shareholding percentage or total value of
foreign investment.39
Once a Member makes specific national treatment
commitment(s), unless the specific commitment(s) provide otherwise,
the Member must “accord to services and service suppliers of any
other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of
services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own
like services and service suppliers.”40
E. Exceptions
GATS provides many exceptions from general and specific
commitments. The applicability of the prudential carve-out clause
may depend on the reasoning of those exceptions, as discussed in
Part V(A)(2), and at this point it is sufficient to be generally aware of
the existence of those exceptions. Some of those exceptions include:
economic integration agreements, labor market integration
agreements, balance of payment safeguards, MFN exemptions,
government procurement, providing advantages to adjacent
countries, emergency safeguard measures, essential security interest,
disclosure of information contrary to public interest, movement of

38
39
40

Id. art. XVI.1, XVII.1; see also BHALA, supra note 4, at 1585.
GATS, supra note 9, art. XVI.2.
Id. art. XVII.1.
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natural persons, administration of domestic regulations, and general
exceptions.41
For example GATS Article XIV, General Exceptions
provides five types of measures which a Member may implement that
are exempted from the Member’s general or specific commitments.42
Of the five categories of measures, three of the categories require
measures to be “necessary.”43 For example, subparagraph (c) in part
permits implementation of measures “necessary to secure compliance
with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Agreement . . . relating to . . . the prevention of
deceptive and fraudulent practices. . . .”44 In other words, if a
Member is implementing a law or a regulation related to prevention
of deceptive and fraudulent practices, and that law or regulation is
not inconsistent with Member’s commitments under the Agreement,
any measures that are necessary to the implementation of such law or
regulation are also exempted from the Agreement—even if those
necessary measures are inconsistent with the Agreement.45
Additionally, such measure(s) will not be exempted if arbitrary or
discriminatory without legitimate justification(s).46
While the scope of each of these exceptions may be a topic
for a separate article, it may be consequential on the ultimate
determination of whether the prudential carve-out clause applies.

See generally id. art. II.2, II.3, V, VI, X, XII-XIV bis, Annex on Article
II Exemptions.
42
Id. art. XIV.
43
Id. art. XIV.(a)-(c).
44
Id. art. XIV.(c).
45
See id; see generally Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶300-27,
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services].
46
See GATS, supra. note 9, art. XIV; see also U.S. – Gambling and Betting
Services, supra note 45, ¶ 339-51.
41
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IV. ANNEX ON FINANCIAL SERVICES: PRUDENTIAL CARVE-OUT
CLAUSE
Trade in the financial service sector is also governed by the
Annex on Financial Services (the “Annex”).47 The tension between
trade liberalization commitments and nations’ sovereignty presents
itself in the prudential carve-out clause contained in the Annex.
Prudential carve-out clause provides an exception from general and
specific GATS commitments:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of the
Agreement, a Member shall not be prevented from
taking measures for prudential reasons, including for
the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders
or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a
financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity
and stability of the financial system. Where such
measures do not conform with the provisions of the
Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of
avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations
under the Agreement.48
This text in the GATS has attracted much attention. Many
have claimed that the prudential exception was not clear and
clarification was necessary, sometimes attempting to provide
clarification.49 Also, there has been some confusion about whether
GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services.
Id.
49
See generally Communication From Barbados: Unintended Consequences of
Remedial Measures taken to correct the Global Financial Crisis: Possible Implications for WTO
Compliance, COMMITTEE ON TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES, ¶¶ 11, 23,
JOB/SERV/38,
(Feb.
18,
2011),
https://www.coc.org/files/BarbadosSubmission.pdf (“It would seem that the
wording of paragraph 2 of the GATS Annex on Financial Services may need to be
amended.”); Roger Kampf, Liberalisation of Financial Services in the GATS and Domestic
Regulation, 3 INT. TRADE L. & REG. 155 (1997) (“The scope of this exemption to
basic GATS principles is not well defined. It can therefore be expected that
measures taken under this provision will be the subject of controversial
interpretation in the future, possibly in the context of dispute settlement
procedures.”); Juan A. Marchetti & Petros C. Mavroidis, What Are the Main
Challenges for the GATS Framework? Don’t Talk About Revolution, 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
47
48
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the measure or the reason for that measure must be prudential in
order to qualify as an exception under the clause.50 Some have stated
that further clarification was necessary with respect to the apparent
contradiction between the first and the second sentences, sometimes
calling the clause a “self-cancelling loophole.”51 Others expressed
concerns that the exception will be used for disguised protectionist
measures.52 Some predicted that the issue will eventually appear in
REV. 511 (2004) (“Examples of provisions the scope of which is unclear
include: the scope of the so-called ‘prudential carve-out.’”); Dominique Servais &
Julie Dutry, GATS 2000: High Stakes for the Financial Services Sector?, 6 INT. BUS. L. J.
653, (1993) (“[T]he clause is interpreted differently according to the country.”);
Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, GATS’ Prudential Carve Out in Financial Services and Its Relation
with Prudential Regulation, 57 INT. COMP. L. Q. 613 (2008) (“The difficulty of the
prudential carve out is that while the uncertainty caused by its text is clear, there
has not been any indication or the urgent need to revise it.”); Michael S. Barr &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT. L.
15 (2006) (“[T]he financial services accord requires market liberalization and
national treatment, but permits countries to engage in valid ‘prudential measures’
that would otherwise be inconsistent with the agreement; the scope of such
prudential measures is likely to be circumscribed by adherence to the Basel
standards.”) (citation omitted); Gretchen Morgenson, Barriers to Change, From Wall
St.
and
Geneva,
N.Y.
Times,
Mar.
17,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/business/wto-and-barriers-to-financialchange.html?_r=0 (“Last October, Ecuador asked that the W.T.O. review financial
rules so that the country could preserve its ability to create regulations that ensure
‘the integrity and stability of the financial system.’”).
50
E.g., Roger Kampf, Liberalisation of Financial Services in the GATS and
Domestic Regulation, 3 INT. TRADE L. & REG. 155, 158 (1997); G-20 Pittsburgh
Summit, Special Pittsburgh G-20 Report from Public Citizen’s Global Trade
Watch, No Meaningful Safeguards for Prudential Measures in World Trade Organization’s
Financial Service Deregulation Agreements, at 10-17 (Sept. 2009).
51
G-20 Pittsburgh Summit, Special Pittsburgh G-20 Report from
Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, No Meaningful Safeguards for Prudential Measures
in World Trade Organization’s Financial Service Deregulation Agreements, at 3-5 (Sept.
2009); see also Communication from Barbados, supra note 49, ¶ 11; Alan
Alexandroff et al , Global Trade Watch on the Prudential Car Out, International
Economic Law and Policy Blog (Dec. 12, 2015, 11:57 PM),
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2010/05/global-trade-watch-on-theprudential-carve-out.html.
52
E.g., Dominique Servais & Julie Dutry, GATS 2000: High Stakes for the
Financial Services Sector?, 6 INT. BUS. L. J. 653, 664-65 (1993) (“It is often
propounded that there is a real risk of the prudential clause being used by some
countries as an mechanism to justify the upholding of certain regulations that aim,
under the prudential veil, to protect the local financial industry by either refusing,
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front of a WTO panel.53 While others stated that the “confrontational
approach” within the dispute settlement system [was] unlikely.54 In
any event, the importance of this clause has not been overstated.
“After a decision is rendered, the losing nation will see how much (or
how little) sovereignty has been transferred to the WTO.”55 Such a
decision was rendered on September 30, 2015 by a WTO panel.
A. Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services:
Report of the Panel
On September 30, 2015 a WTO panel for the first time
addressed the prudential carve-out clause in Argentina – Measures
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services (the “Panel Report”).56
In the Panel Report, inter alia, Argentina claimed that the
prudential exception in paragraph 2(a) of the Annex applied to
measures 5 (requirements for market access related to reinsurance
services) and 6 (requirements for access to the Argentina’s capital
market) implemented by Argentina.57 Measure 5 essentially banned
or limiting, access to their market.”); Roger Kampf, Liberalisation of Financial Services
in the GATS and Domestic Regulation, 3 INT. TRADE L. & REG. 155, 161 (1997)
(“Individual countries could, for example, attempt to cover discriminatory
treatment under the prudential carve-out.”).
53
Duncan Alford, International Financial System Risks: A Current
Assessment, 1 J. INT. BANKING L. & REG. 40 (2005) (“The operation of this
prudential supervision ‘carve out’ and the trade liberalisation [sic] provisions of the
Financial Services Agreement will undoubtedly come before the WTO dispute
resolution mechanism in the near future.”); Roger Kampf, Liberalisation of Financial
Services in the GATS and Domestic Regulation, 3 INT. TRADE L. & REG. 155, 158
(1997) (“It can [] be expected that measures taken under this provision will be the
subject of controversial interpretation in the future, possibly in the context of
dispute settlement procedures.”).
54
Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, GATS’ Prudential Carve Out in Financial Services
and Its Relation with Prudential Regulation, 57 INT. COMP. L. Q. 613, 640 (2008) (“The
community of international financial regulators is close-knit, and such a
confrontational approach [bringing dispute within WTO dispute settlement system]
does not seem likely.”)
55
Duncan Alford, International Financial System Risks: A Current
Assessment, 1 J. INT. BANKING L. & REG. 40, 41 (2005).
56
Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services,
WT/DS453/R (Sept. 30, 2015).
57
Id. ¶¶ 7.781, 7.808, WT/DS453/R (Sept. 30, 2015).
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the supply of reinsurance services from countries not cooperating for
purposes of tax transparency and the global fight against money
laundering and terrorist financing according to the criteria defined by
the Financial Action Task Force.58 Measure 6 banned stock market
intermediaries from transacting (e.g. public offering of negotiable
securities, forward contracts, futures or options of any nature or
other financial instruments or products) with persons from noncooperative countries.59 A country was to be considered
“cooperative” if it: (i) “[had] signed with Argentina a tax information
exchange agreement or an international double taxation convention
with a broad information exchange clause, provided that the
information [was] effectively exchanged; or (ii) [had] initiated with
Argentina the negotiations necessary for concluding such an
agreement and/ or convention.”60 Under measures 5 and 6 Argentina
imposed different requirements on service suppliers depending on
whether they were established and registered in cooperative or noncooperative countries.61
Panama argued against the applicability of the prudential
carve-out clause.62 Although the panel ultimately found for Panama
on this issue, Panama appealed the report to the Appellate Body
arguing that the panel erred, inter alia, in not limiting the scope of the
prudential carve-out clause to “domestic” regulations.63 Argentina
also appealed the Panel Report arguing, contrary to the panel’s
finding, that the services provided from cooperative and noncooperative countries were not “like” services.64 While the Panel
Report is pending an appeal, the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”)
will not be able to adopt the Panel Report.65 The Appellate Body
report, once issued, will be automatically adopted, receiving legal
See id ¶¶ 2.23–2.34.
See id. ¶¶ 2.35–2.36.
60
Id. ¶¶ 7.907 [footnote omitted].
61
Id. ¶ 7.907.
62
Id. ¶¶ 7.793–7.807.
63
See Notification of an Appeal by Panama, Argentina – Measures Relating
to Trade in Goods and Services, WT/DS453/7 (Oct. 30, 2015).
64
See Notification of Another Appeal by Argentina, Argentina – Measures
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, WT/DS453/8 (Nov. 30, 2015).
65
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes art. 16, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
58
59
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force, unless the DSB decides by unanimous consensus not to adopt
the report.66 Customarily when DSB adopts a panel report, it is
adopted “as modified by the Appellate Body”;67 thus, ultimately DSB
may adopt the Appellate Body’s findings of law which were directly
appealed. Appellate Body may even modify rulings on issues that
were not directly appealed if the modification was necessary for
ruling on the issues appealed.
The Panel Report provided important guidance and if
adopted by the DSB will serve as persuasive authority for the
development of the international trade law as the meaning of the
clause and its practical application became especially important in the
context of post-recession regulations. The Panel Report adopted a
three-prong legal standard under which the measure qualifying for
the prudential exception must: (1) affect the supply of financial
services, (2) be taken for prudential reasons, (3) and not be used as
means of avoiding the Country-Member’s commitments or
obligations.68 Consequently the Panel Report applied the adopted
standard to the measures implemented by Argentina, as discussed in
subsection (4).
1. The Scope of the Annex: Measures Affecting the Supply of Financial
Services. - The Panel Report found that the provision represents an
exception; therefore, the burden of proof lies with the responding
party to demonstrate that its measures are covered under the
provision.69 As a preliminary matter, the panel report considered
paragraph 1(a) as context for the interpretation of paragraph 2(a) of
the Annex—the prudential carve-out clause; thus, it found that the
party claiming the exception must demonstrate that the measure in
question is a measure “affecting the supply of financial services.”70

Id. art. 17.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 257, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997)
[hereinafter EC – Bananas III].
68
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶¶ 7.851, 7.796 (Although the parties did not appeal any of the three prongs of the
adopted legal standard, Panama appealed arguing that there is a fourth prong
requirement in the Annex that the measure must be “domestic.”)
69
Id. ¶ 7.816.
70
Id. ¶ 7.822 (citation omitted).
66
67
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Having previously found that the measures in question were
“affecting trade in services” and were in violation of the GATS, the
Panel Report stated that if a measure affects trade in services under
Article I:1, it must be considered to be a measure affecting the supply of
services.71 In other words, the panel report equated the words trade
and supply, perhaps because Article I:2 of the GATS states that “[f]or
purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply
of a service. . . .”72
To sum it up, if a measure affects trade in services and
violates the GATS, then the prudential exception may apply if the
services affected by that measure are financial. According to the panel
report affecting has a broader meaning than “regulating” or
“governing.”73 As to what services are considered financial, the Panel
Report stated that “paragraph 5 of the Annex on Financial Services
defines the concept of a ‘financial service’ as ‘any service of a
financial nature offered by a financial service supplier of a
Member’ . . . [and] all the services subsequently listed in paragraph 5
of the Annex are services of ‘a financial nature.’”74
2. Measures Taken “for Prudential Reasons.” - The Panel Report
took on the task of determining which measures are “for prudential
reasons” by: (a) distinguishing that the reason for the measure must be
prudential—not the measure itself, (b) analyzing the term “prudential
reasons,” and (c) analyzing the word “for” separately.75

Id. ¶ 7.851.
GATS, supra note 9, art. I.2.
73
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶ 7.854 (quoting EC – Bananas III, supra note 67, ¶ 220) (“The ordinary meaning of
the word ‘affecting’ implies a measure that has ‘an effect on,’ which indicates a
broad scope of application. This interpretation is further reinforced by the
conclusions of previous panels that the term ‘affecting’ in the context of Article III
of the GATT 1947 is wider in scope than such terms as ‘regulating’ or
‘governing.’”)
74
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶ 7.857.
75
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶¶ 7.859-63.
71
72
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a. Reasons must be prudential. - Panel Report found that the
reasons for the measure must be prudential.76 Although Panama
observed that other paragraphs in the Annex (paragraphs 3 and 4)
refer to “prudential measures” and “prudential issues” and argued
that the key term is the word “prudential”—not the “reasons,”77 the
Panel Report emphasized that the text speaks of the reasons being
prudential and not the measures.78 Moreover, the Panel Report stated
that a contrary interpretation “would not give any meaning to the
term ‘reasons’ used in that provision.”79 Finding that there is no other
reason why to use the terms (prudential reasons and prudential
measures) interchangeably, the panel held that the textual term—
prudential reasons—should be used instead.80
b. Prudential means “preventative” or “precautionary.” - Next the
Panel Report consulted dictionary definitions of “motivos coutelares”
(prudential reasons) and held that the ordinary meaning of
“prudential” is “preventative” or “precautionary.”81 The Panel Report
looked into the Spanish Royal Academy’s dictionary and found that
“motivo” (motive) means “that which moves or has efficacy or power
to move; moving cause or reason for something” and “coutelar”
(prudential)—“preventative, precautionary; said of a measure or rule
intended to prevent a particular outcome or guard against that which
might impede it.”82 Also, the Panel Report considered English and
French dictionary definitions of equally authentic versions of the
provision.83 The Panel Report looked into the Shorter Oxford Dictionary
and found that the word “prudential” is defined as “[o]f, involving or
characterized by prudence; exercising prudence, esp. in business
affairs.”84 The Panel Report looked into the Le Petit Robert
dictionary, but did not find a definition for “prudential,” instead the
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. ¶ 7.863.
Id. ¶ 7.860 (footnote omitted).
Id. ¶ 7.861.
Id. ¶ 7.862.
See id. ¶¶ 7.859-63.
See id. ¶ 7.865.
Id. (quoting DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAÑOLA (23rd ed.

2014)).
83

See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note

56, ¶ 7.866.
84

Id. (quoting SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (6th ed.

2007)).
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report looked into the word “prudence” which was defined as
“[a]ttitude of a person who, reflecting on the significance and
consequences of his acts, takes steps to avoid mistakes and possible
mishaps, and refrains from anything that might be a source of
harm.”85 Panama, Argentina, and third parties such as United States
and Brazil agreed with the definition of “preventative” or
“precautionary,” except Panama applied it to the word “measures”
and further defined “precautionary” differently.86
The Panel Report found support in the context of the clause
which provides a non-exhaustive list of prudential reasons: “the
protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to
whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier” or “to
ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.”87 According
to the panel, these are examples of precautionary reasons.88 Then, the
panel basically recognized that “preventative” or “precautionary” are
also vague words and stated that the meaning and importance
attached to prudential reasons may vary over time; however, such
vagueness—according to the panel—is appropriate, because “WTO
Members should have sufficient freedom to define the prudential
reasons that underpin their measures, in accordance with their own
scales of values.”89 The panel found support in policy objectives
identified in previous panel reports and stated that CountryMembers, “in applying concepts equally important for society, such
as those covered by Article XX for the GATT 1994 [general

Id. (quoting DICTIONNAIRE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE (2000)).
See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note
56, ¶¶ 7.797, 7.867 (citing Third Party Written Submission of the United States,
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, at 7 n.13, WT/DS/453,
(June
4,
2014),
available
at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/US%203rd%20Pty%20Sub%20Fin.pdf)
(citation omitted).
87
See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note
56, ¶ 7.866; see also GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services, § 2(a).
88
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note
56¶ 7.868
89
Id. ¶ 7.871.
85
86
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exceptions], are entitled to determine the level of protection they
consider appropriate.”90
The panel also found that the broad interpretation of the
word “prudential” “corresponds to the object and purpose of the
GATS, as set out in its own preamble, which recognizes ‘the right of
Members to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the supply
of services within their territories in order to meet national policy
objectives.’”91 The Panel Report concluded its analysis of the word
“prudential” by stating that a broad interpretation is “consistent with
the concerns of the international community regarding the nature and
impact of the financial risks and the consequent need to preserve
sufficient flexibility when determining the prudential reasons to
which the regulation should respond.”92
c. Measures taken “for” prudential reasons require a “rational
relationship” between the measure and its prudential objective. - Before
interpreting what “for” means, the Panel Report compared the
prudential exception provision to the general exceptions of Articles
XIV of the GATS and XX of the GATT 1994 and found that the
prudential exception provision does not require the measures to be
“necessary.”93 Therefore, the prudential exception provision does
not require measures to be the least trade-restrictive means for
achieving the stated objective.94
The panel began the interpretation of the word “for” by
looking at its ordinary meaning.95 It looked into dictionaries in
Spanish, English and French and found that the meaning similarly
Id. ¶ 7.870 (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 176, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R, (Dec. 11, 2000); Appellate Body Report, European Communities
– Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 168,
WT/DS135/AB/R, (Mar. 12, 2011)) (citation omitted).
91
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶ 7.872 (quoting GATS, supra note 9, Preamble).
92
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶ 7.875.
93
Id. ¶ 7.884.
94
Id. (footnote omitted) (Note that in the Panel Report used the words
“objective” and “reason” interchangeably.).
95
Id. ¶ 7.886.
90
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denotes a causation.96 Therefore, “[a] measure taken ‘for’ prudential
reasons would [] be a measure with prudential cause.”97 Then
essentially the panel held that for a measure to be taken “for”
prudential reasons, there must “be a rational relationship of cause
and effect between the measure and the reason for it” in fact.98 “[A]
central aspect of the rational relationship of cause and effect is the
adequacy of the measure to the prudential reason, that is to say,
whether the measure, through its design, structure and architecture,
contributes to achieving the desired effect.”99
3. The Meaning of the Second Sentence of the Prudential Carve-out
Clause Remains Uninterpreted. - The panel refused to interpret the
meaning of the “[measures] shall not be used as a means of avoiding
the Member’s commitments or obligations under the Agreement,”
because it had already found that the prudential exception did not
cover the measures in question under the second prong of the legal
test.100
4. Panel Report’s Application of the Three-prong Legal Standard to
Argentina’s Measures. - The Panel Report applied this three-prong
standard to Argentina’s measures 5 and 6 and found that the
measures were not taken for prudential reasons.101 Argentina’s
measure 5 placed certain requirements on “non-cooperative” country
service suppliers before they could gain access to the Argentine
reinsurance service market.102 Measure 6 prohibited certain stock
market transactions with entities from “non-cooperative”
countries.103
The Panel Report agreed that the reasons identified by
Argentina with respect to measure 5 were prudential, namely “to
protect the insured, to ensure the solvency of insurers and reinsurers,
and to avoid the possible systemic risk of the insolvency and failure
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id. ¶ 7.887 (citations omitted).
Id. ¶ 7.888.
Id. ¶ 7.889.
Id. ¶ 7.911.
Id. ¶ 7.945.
See id. ¶¶ 7.906-7.920, 7.939-7.944.
See discussion supra pp. 12-13.
See id.
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of direct insurance companies.”104 The Panel Report found that
requesting relevant information from the regulatory authorities of
other jurisdictions is part of those identified reasons.105
The panel found the main issue in the conditions under
which a country was to be considered “cooperative.”106 More
specifically, one way a country could be considered cooperative was if
it had “initiated with Argentina the negotiations necessary for
concluding [an agreement with tax information exchange or an
international double taxation convention with a broad information
exchange clause] and/or convention.”107 The panel stated that this
criteria does not provide a “formal mechanism for the effective
exchange of information between Argentina and the country with
which it [was] negotiating.”108 In other words, mere negotiations did
not provide substantive information exchange.
There was another problem with the criteria under which a
country could be designated as “cooperative.” Argentina published
the list of cooperative countries only once, at the beginning of every
year, so countries that began negotiations after the list was published
would have no access to the Argentine service market until the
following year.109 In this instance, Panama was on the January 2014
list, because it had begun negotiations in November of 2013, but
other countries that began negotiations in 2014 were not on the list
yet, although they were in the same situation as Panama—merely
negotiating.110 Hence, the panel held that the entire measure did not
have a “rational relationship of cause and effect with the identified
prudential reasons,” because granting “cooperative” status without

104

Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,

¶ 7.904.
105 Id. ¶ 7.910 (“In our view, having adequate and timely information
concerning the foreign reinsurance company is fundamental for the purpose of
anticipating crises or systemic risks which, as we have seen, could be incubating in
an imperceptible manner over time and suddenly erupt.”).
106 Id. ¶ 7.913.
107 Id. ¶ 7.912 (footnote omitted).
108 Id. ¶ 7.916.
109 See id. ¶ 7.918.
110 See id.
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actual information exchange did not bear such relationship with the
stated prudential reason.111
With respect to measure 6, the Panel Report found several
reasons identified by Argentina to be prudential: “strengthen[ing] the
mechanisms for protecting and preventing abuses against small
investors, within the framework of the protective function of
consumer law”112; “ensur[ing] the full effectiveness of the principles
of investor protection, fairness, efficiency, transparency, nonfragmentation and reduction of systemic risk”;113 and “prevention of
money laundering and terrorist financing,” which in turn strengthen
the integrity and stability of the financial system.114 However, the
panel found that there was no rational relationship of cause and
effect with the identified prudential reasons, because measure 6,
similar to measure 5, exempted service suppliers from “cooperative”
countries that did not actually exchange any information.115
V. ANALYZING THE PANEL REPORT
Even if the Appellate Body renders a decision without
significant modifications and DSB adopts the Panel Report, the legal
standard to be used in future disputes is still be open to arguments.116
“In the 1996 Japan Alcoholic Beverages case, . . . . [t]he Appellate
Body concluded adopted panel reports are not binding in a strict
sense in a subsequent case, even if the subsequent case involves the
same parties and basically the same facts.”117 Article IX:2 of the
WTO Agreement provides the exclusive authority to adopt
See id. ¶¶ 7.919-7.920.
Id. ¶ 7.932.
113 Id. ¶ 7.933.
114 Id. ¶¶ 7.934-7.935 (footnotes omitted).
115 Id. ¶¶ 7.939-7.944.
116 See discussion supra pp. 13-14.
117 BHALA, supra note 4, at 19; see also Appellate Body Report, Japan –
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, pp. 12-13, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/ AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II]
(“Generally, in international law, the essence of subsequent practice in interpreting
a treaty has been recognized as a ‘concordant, common and consistent’ sequence of
acts or pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernable pattern
implying the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”).
111
112

770

2016

Anwesen

4:2

interpretations of the Multilateral Trade Agreements—in this case
GATS—to the Ministerial Conference and the General Council.118
“The fact that such an ‘exclusive authority’ in interpreting the treaty
has been established so specifically in the WTO Agreement is reason
enough to conclude that such authority does not exist by implication
or by inadvertence elsewhere.”119 Nonetheless, the Appellate Body
stated that “panel reports are important part of the GATT acquis” and
create “legitimate expectation among WTO Members”; thus, “should
be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.120
The following sections will: (A) analyze the interpretation of
“for prudential reasons,” and (B) briefly discuss the second sentence
of the prudential carve-out clause.
A. Interpretation of “for Prudential Reasons”
Interpretation of the prudential carve-out clause involves a
multi-layered inquiry. The Appellate Body’s framework for
interpreting GATS provisions provides a valuable foundation for
analyzing the Panel Report.121 Under Article 3.2 of the DSU,
Country-Members recognized that the WTO dispute settlement
system may clarify provisions of covered agreements in “accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”122
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(the “Vienna Convention”) are well settled in WTO case law to be
such customary rules.123 Interpreting “measures taken for prudential

Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7, art IX.2.
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, at 13.
120 Id. at 14.
121 See generally U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45 (The
report provides a step-by-step framework for treaty interpretation according to
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.).
122 DSU, supra note 65, art. 3.2.
123 See U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 159 (“[T]he task
of interpreting any other treaty text[] involves identifying the common intention of
Members, and is to be achieved by following the customary rules of interpretation
of public international law, codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention.”); see also Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, ¶¶ 61-62,
WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov. 28, 2002); Appellate Body Report, United States –
118
119
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reasons,” as discussed below, requires looking into: (1) ordinary
meaning, (2) context, (3) object and purpose, (4) other things taken
into account with the context, and (5) supplementary means of
interpretation.124 However, “it should be kept in mind that treaty
interpretation is an integrated operation, where interpretive rules or
principles must be applied as connected and mutually reinforcing
components of a holistic exercise.”125
1. Ordinary Meaning. - First, analyzing under Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention, the ordinary meaning of “prudential” is vague.
“Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention requires a treaty to be
interpreted ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.’”126 Identifying the ordinary meaning of a
term may begin with dictionary definitions; however, the Appellate
Body in Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 300-27,
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. – Gambling and
Betting Services], made a reservation for using dictionary definitions
alone, because such approach is too mechanical.127 According to the
Appellate Body, if in abstract the range of definitions of the word
may include the definitions of the contestant parties, then the next
proper step is to inquire into which one of the definitions is properly
attributable to the party-respondent.128
The Panel Report determined the ordinary meaning of
“prudential” mainly from Spanish and French dictionaries.129
Although the Panel Report defined the word “prudential” as
“preventative” or “precautionary,” this does not really clarify what
reasons may or may not be justified, because virtually any reason for
a measure can be stated in terms of being “preventative” or
“precautionary.” Consider a measure implemented for the reason of
Continued Existence and application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 267, WT/DS350/AB/R
(Feb. 4, 2009) [hereinafter U.S. – Continued Zeroing].
124 See U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45.
125 U.S. – Continued Zeroing, supra note 123, ¶ 268.
126 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 164.
127 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶¶ 164-66.
128 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 167.
129 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.ii.
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aiding a quick recovery of financial institutions after an economic
recession: Is not that reason preventing a slow or no recovery? Thus,
virtually any reason may be “preventative.”
Further, according to the Panel Report, if “prudential” means
preventative, and the text states “measures for prudential reasons”
are basically exempted, then what will give the panel authority to not
exempt any absurd preventative reasons a country will claim?
Consider a Country-Member claiming that the prudential reason for a
measure is to “prevent” all left-handed people from making any
financial investments. According to the current interpretation of
“prudential” as “preventative” or “precautionary,” such a measure
would qualify for the exception. It may seem at first that such a
measure would not qualify under the exception, because there would
be no rational relationship of cause and effect,130 but such a
relationship will need to exist only between the actual measure and
the stated reason for it, and the stated reason is preventing left-handed
people making certain investments. Under the present definition of
“prudential” as “preventative” or “precautionary” coupled with the
fact that any measure may be stated in terms of preventing some
event, the current interpretation of the word “prudential” means
virtually any reason, including absurd “preventative” reasons. Because
the word “prudential” practically loses its meaning, and “the
Appellate Body has stated that ‘interpretation must give meaning and
effect to all the terms of a treaty,’”131 a careful interpretation of the
word “prudential” is still required.
Dictionaries do not clarify the word. The Oxford English
Dictionary defines “prudential” as “of, belonging to, or of the nature
of prudence; involving prudence, characterized or prescribed by
forethought and careful deliberations” or as “matters that fall within
the scope or province of prudence.”132 The Oxford English
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.iii.
See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note
56, ¶ 7.840 (quoting Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, p. 23, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter US –
Gasoline]; see also Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 271, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16,
2006) [hereinafter US Offset Act].
132 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 729 (2nd ed. 1991).
130
131
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Dictionary defines “prudence” as “ability to discern the most
suitable, politic, or profitable course of action, esp. as regards
conduct; practical wisdom, discretion,” or “wisdom; knowledge of or
skill in a matter.”133 The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines
“prudential” as “of involving, or characterized by prudence;
exercising prudence, esp. in business affairs” and defines “prudence”
as “the quality of being prudent” or as “wisdom; knowledge of or
skill in a matter;” or “foresight; providence.”134 It also defines
“prudent” as “characterized by or proceeding from care in following
the most politic and profitable course; having or showing sound
judgment in practical affairs; circumspect, sensible” or as “wise,
discerning, sapient.”135 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
defines “prudential” as “of, relating to, or proceeding from
prudence” or as “exercising prudence.”136 Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary defines “prudence” as “the ability to govern
and discipline oneself by the use of reason,” or as “sagacity or
shrewdness in the management of affairs,” or as “skill and good
judgment in the use of resources,” or as “caution or circumspection
as to danger or risk.”137
As you can see from the English dictionary definitions, as
opposed to French and Spanish as found by the Panel Report,
“prudential” may have meanings different from “preventative” or
“precautionary.” According to the dictionaries, a “prudential” reason,
among the meaning adopted by the panel, may mean a reason
“prescribed by forethought and careful deliberations” or a reason
“involving, or characterized by quality of being wise” or a reason “of
involving the quality of having or showing sound judgment” or a
reason “relating to or proceeding from the ability to govern and
discipline oneself by the use of reason or by skill and good judgment
in the use of resources.” All these definitions encompass a
requirement that whatever must be “prudential” must in some sense
be well thought of, be wise, show sound judgment, or be reasonable.
133
134

Id. at 728-29.
2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2396 (1st ed.

1993).
135
136

Id.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1002 (11th ed.

2005).
137

Id.
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Thus, a closer look into the context in which the word “prudential”
was used is required.
2. Context. - After inquiring into the ordinary meaning of the
text, if a definitive conclusion cannot be reached, the next step is to
inquire into the context in which the relevant terms are situated
pursuant to Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention.138 Article 31
paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention also provides for documents
in addition to the text of the treaty which may be considered as
context.139 “Documents can be characterized as context only where
there is sufficient evidence of their constituting an ‘agreement relating
to the treaty’ between the parties or of their ‘accept[ance by the
parties] as an instrument related to the treaty.’”140 Thus, context
documents may comprise of the entire GATS Agreement, including
its preamble and annexes, schedules of specific commitments of the
respondent-party, provisions of covered agreements other than
GATS, and GATS schedules of other Members.141 When inquiring
into context documents, the Appellate Body first examined “the
immediate context in which the relevant entry [was] found.”142
Second, the Appellate Body examined “the context provided by the
structure of the GATS itself.”143 Third, the Appellate Body looked
“beyond the GATS to other covered agreements” where it also
considered other Member’s Schedules.144
Here the main word under scrutiny—prudential—is an
adjective, which within the most immediate textual context of the
word qualifies another word—reasons.145 To support the panel’s
finding, the most important context to be considered in treaty
interpretation is the textual context in which the word was used.146 In
U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 168; see also U.S. –
Continued Zeroing, supra note 123, ¶ 268.
139 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
140 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 175.
141 See id. ¶¶ 178-187.
142 Id. ¶ 179.
143 Id. ¶ 180.
144 Id. ¶ 181.
145 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.i.
146 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (“A treaty
138
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this case it is not the measure itself that must be prudential—but the
reasons for that measure.147 Although a prudential measure and a
measure implemented for prudential reason are not mutually
exclusive, and in most cases the two will likely overlap, this textual
distinction may be material to the ultimate determination of what
measures may be permissible under the prudential carve-out clause.148
Oversimplifying the complexity of financial regulations, consider that
it will be a relatively simpler task for a WTO panel to analyze whether
the reasons for the measure are prudential versus whether the measure
itself is prudential. It is easier to find consensus on what is a prudential
reason versus what measures may be implemented for those reasons,
because for every prudential reason there are likely to be multiple
prudential measures that could be implemented. In other words, a
prudential measure requirement would give less discretion to the
sovereign Country-Member as to what measures to implement, while
under the prudential reason requirement a Country-Member will be able
to exercise more discretion as to what measures to implement.
Looking at the context of the entire first sentence of the
prudential carve-out clause, the prudential carve-out provision
provides concrete examples of prudential reasons: “protection of
investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary
duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity
and stability of the financial system.”149 Thus, for example, a
prudential reason may be the protection of the depositors. In this
example whether a particular measure does or does not protect the
depositors at this point seems to be irrelevant. The Panel Report
inquired into the genuineness of that prudential reason—a fact
interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to
be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context,
that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be
sought.”); see also Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, p. 12 (“Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation
for the interpretive process: interpretation must be based above all upon the text of
the treaty.”) (internal quotations omitted).
147 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.i.
148 See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note
56, ¶ 7.831 (“The meaning of the two expressions cannot be the same and, in our
opinion, this is an important aspect to be borne in mind when interpreting this
provision.”).
149 GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services, art. 2.a.
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intensive inquiry—when analyzing the “for” element in the phrase
“for prudential reasons.”150 Although the Panel Report found that
“prudential” means “precautionary” or “preventative” by pointing
out that the prudential reasons listed in the text are all examples of
“precautionary” or “preventative,”151 those reasons are not any more
“precautionary” as they are “wise” or “reasonable.” The list of
examples in the provision supports virtually all of the definitions of
“prudential” stated in the dictionaries.152 Nonetheless, the nonexhaustive list of “prudential” reasons indicates an intention to leave
the definition of “prudential” broader than just the examples in the
list.153
Looking into the broader context [the entire GATS
Agreement] may be more helpful from the perspective of identifying
what are not “prudential reasons”, rather than what are. If another
part of the GATS already provides an exception for some measure(s),
the reason for providing that exception effectively cannot be a
“prudential” reason for purposes of the prudential exception
provision, because otherwise the former exception provision would
be reduced to “redundancy” or “inutility.”154 The prudential
exception provision may not serve as a catch-all provision to
encompass those measures which fail under some element of one of
the other exceptions. For example, economic integration agreements
are an exception.155 The reason for exempting integration agreements
from GATS commitments is that those agreements liberalize trade
between at least some countries, and some liberalization is better than
none.156 Therefore, a reason for the prudential measure under the

See discussion supra Part III.A.2.iii.
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶¶ 7.868-7.869.
152 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
153 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56,
¶¶ 7.869-7.871.
154 See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note
56, ¶ 7.840 (citing US – Gasoline, supra note 130, p. 23) (footnotes omitted); see also
US Offset Act, supra note 131, ¶ 271; Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, p.
12.
155 See generally GATS, supra note 9, art. V.
156 Cf. GATS, supra note 9, art. V.4. (To qualify for the exception an
integration agreement, “[it] shall be designed to facilitate trade between the parties
150
151
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prudential carve-out clause may not be to liberalize local trade
between some countries or preventing regional market barriers,
because such a scenario is already covered. Similarly, a CountryMember should not be able to claim that the reason for the measure
is to address the “serious balance-of-payment and external financial
difficulty or threat thereof,” because such a reason is already covered
by Article XII of the GATS.157 Otherwise, for example, a CountryMember could implement a discriminatory measure aimed to prevent a
threat of a balance-of-payment difficulty, which is prohibited under
Article XII(2)(a), so long as such discriminatory measure would be
“for prudential reasons”—preventing the threat of a balance-ofpayment crisis. To be clear, a Member is free to claim exceptions
under various provisions of GATS simultaneously; however, under
the prudential carve-out clause analysis, as a matter of law, some
reasons should not be considered prudential—reasons that already
prompted negotiators to create specific exceptions in other GATS
provisions.
Finally, Members’ Schedules attached to the GATS may also
serve as context for treaty interpretation purposes.158 For example, if
a Member’s Schedule provides an interpretation of what may be a
“prudential reason” for the purposes of the prudential exception
provision, then such interpretation will be used by the panels and the
Appellate Body as context for treaty interpretation. In the present
case, Argentina’s Schedule did not contain any reference to the
prudential carve-out clause.159
3. Object and Purpose. - When no clear meaning could have
been discerned, the Appellate Body in U.S. – Gambling and Betting
Services turned to the object and purpose of the GATS for further
guidance.160 When considering the Preamble to the GATS, which is
context, to discern the object and purpose of the prudential
provision, the Panel Report emphasized “the right of the Members to
to the agreement and shall not in respect of any Member outside the agreement
raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services . . . .”).
157 See generally GATS, supra note 9, art. XII.
158 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 181.
159 Argentina – Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/4 (Apr. 15,
1994).
160 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 187.
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regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the supply of services
within their territories in order to meet national policy objectives.”161
The panel emphasized this objective to give Country-Members broad
discretion in identifying what is and what is not prudential.162
However, there must be some limits on such discretion; otherwise,
the prudential carve-out clause will render the entire GATS
meaningless with respect to financial services.
GATS has other objects and purposes which weight against
the “right of the Members to regulate.” GATS Preamble recognizes
“the growing importance of trade in services for the growth and
development of the world economy,” and aims “to establish . . . rules
for trade in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under
conditions of . . . progressive liberalization. . . .”163 Therefore, as
much as the object and purpose of the prudential exception provision
may be to recognize national policy objectives, it is also not to permit
too broad of an exception, because progressive liberalization and
expansion of trade in services are also GATS objectives.
Consequently, if the claimed prudential reason for the measure does
not go against the objective of liberalized trade, then the object and
purpose of the preamble that recognizes the national policy objective
should prevail and provide broader discretion to the implementing
Country-Member. And inversely, if the prudential reason is facially
trade restrictive, then the free-trade objective should be weighed
against the national policy objective.
4. Other Things Taken into Account Together with the Context. –
Pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
the Appellate Body in U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services continued its
analysis by taking into account any “subsequent practice
establishing the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty.”164 Although not examined by the Appellate Body in the
161

See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note

56, ¶ 7.872.
See id. at ¶¶ 7.870-7.873.
GATS supra note 9, Preamble.
164 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 190 (emphasis
added); see also id. at ¶¶ 191-192 (“[I]n order for ‘practice’ within the meaning of
Article 31(3)(b) to be established: (i) there must be a common, consistent,
discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements; and (ii) those acts or
162
163
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U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, Article 31 paragraph 3 also
requires to take into account with the context “[a]ny subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions” and “[a]ny relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.”165 Moreover, the fourth paragraph of the Article 31 requires
giving a special meaning to a term “if it is established that the
parties so intended.”166
There is no identifiable subsequent practice between the
WTO Members which could constitute an “agreement” to be used in
interpreting the prudential exception clause.167 Nor there is any
special meaning that can be discerned from the text, other than
“prudential” has an “intrinsically evolutionary nature,” because the
list of prudential reasons in the prudential exception provision was
written as non-exhaustive.168
As part of the relevant rules of international law, the Panel
Report emphasized that in the past the Appellate Body “in applying
concepts equally important for society, such as those covered by
Article XX of the GATT 1994 [general exceptions], [CountryMembers] are entitled to determine the level of protection they
consider appropriate.”169 Thus, in interpreting ambiguous or vague
terms or words such as “prudential,” the tendency should favor

pronouncements must imply agreement on the interpretation of the relevant
provision.”) (original emphasis) (citing Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117,
p. 13); Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, p. 14 (Appellate Body found that
panel reports adopted by the GATT contracting parties do not constitute
subsequent practice within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna
Convention.).
165 Vienna Convention, supra note 139, art. 31.3 (emphasis added).
166 Id. at art. 31.4.
167 Perhaps Country-Members may be able to use integration agreements
or international cooperative enforcement agreements to affect the meaning and the
interpretation of the prudential exception clause.
168 See generally Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services,
supra note 56, ¶ 7.873 (citations omitted).
169 Id. at ¶ 7.870 (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 176, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R).
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giving the Country-Members deference to determine their reasons as
they consider appropriate.
5. Supplementary Means of Interpretation. - Finally, when the
above steps led to an ambiguous interpretation, the Appellate Body
U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services turned to the supplementary means
of interpretation.170 Supplementary means of interpretation include
“the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion.”171 This is where documents that did not meet the
requirements to be considered as context, may nonetheless be used in
treaty interpretation as preparatory work.172 Thus far in the analysis,
the meaning of “prudential” remains unsatisfying. However, from
considering other things with the context, it is evident that the word
may have been left vague intentionally to give greater deference to
the Country-Members to determine their level of protection.
Nonetheless, the context of other provisions of the GATS showed
some reasons that may not be prudential for purposes of the
prudential exception provision.173 Thus, supplementary means of
interpretation are important for either confirming that the vagueness
of the word was intentional or to clarify what “prudential reasons”
mean.
First, all negotiations after the adoption of the Annex on the
Financial Services related to clarifying the meaning of the prudential
exception clause, such as the seven times the Committee on Trade in
Financial Services debated on the prudential exception provision, are
irrelevant and do not constitute supplementary means of
interpretation, because they were not “preparatory work.”174 Work in
preparation of the Annex on the Financial Services began when the
Working Group on Financial Service including Insurance was formed
in June of 1990.175 The Working Group held four official meetings,
170

See, e.g., U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶¶ 195, 236,

248.
Vienna Convention, supra note 139, art. 32.
See, e.g., U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 197.
173 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
174 The seven meeting reports of the Committee on Trade in Services can
be found by WTO document numbers S/FIN/M/25 to 31.
175 PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS & NILS HERGER, FINANCIAL REGULATION
AT THE CROSSROADS, 280 (2011).
171
172
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and among other issues, discussed the text of the prudential
exception provision.176
During the first meeting the Chairman of the Working Group
offered five different approached for the prudential carve-out clause,
the first four ranging from narrow to broad in scope: (1) an exception
only to a qualified national treatment provision, (2) permitting all
“reasonable” prudential and fiduciary measures, (3) variation of first
and second options with enumerated examples of permissible
measures, (4) unqualified right to claim the exception, and (5)
defining precise permissible measures to reduce legal uncertainties.177
After the discussion on the topic was concluded, the Chairman stated
that it was not possible to draw a preliminary conclusion as to which
approach to use and that, in his opinion, there should be “wide room
for flexibility in order to allow for the necessary prudential
organizational measures.”178 After the first meeting of the Working
Group three formal proposals regarding the prudential-carve out
clause were circulated on behalf of: the European Communities,
United States, and Malaysia.179
The proposal from the European Communities was
circulated before the second meeting of the working group which
excepted “reasonable measures to safeguard the integrity of the
financial system, provided that these measures are not applied in a

The reports of the meetings can be found in WTO documents
MTN.GNS/FIN 1 to 4.
177 Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, Note on the
Meeting of 11-13 June 1990, ¶ 78, MTN.GNS/FIN/1 (July 5, 1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100236.pdf.
178 Id. at ¶ 95.
179 See DELIMATSIS & HERGER, supra note 175, at 280 (citing Working
Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, Communication from the European
Communities, MTN.GNS/FIN/W/1 (July 10, 1990); Working Group on Financial
Service Including Insurance, Communication from the United States,
MTN.GNS/FIN/W2, (July 12, 1990); Working Group on Financial Service
Including
Insurance,
Communication
of
the
Delegation
of
Malaysia,
MTN.GNS/FIN/W/3 (Sept. 12, 1990)).
176
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manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination.”180
The proposal from the United States was also circulated
before the second meeting which called for “a provision which
permits a Party to take reasonable actions necessary for prudential reasons,
for the protection of investors and depositors, or for the protection
of persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service
provider.”181 Additionally, United States had introduced an informal
paper titled “Provisions regarding financial services” according to
which “all of the proposed provisions were subject to article 9 that
stated that nothing in this agreement shall prevent a party from
taking reasonable actions necessary for prudential reasons.”182 During the
second meeting the representative of the United States stated that
“[r]easons other than prudential ones . . . most often represent the
kind of reasons that the agreement would seek to curtail.”183 With
respect to proposed article 9, which included the words “reasonable”
and “necessary,” Switzerland expressed that it “might require further
specification to increase its juridical clarity.”184
The proposal from Malaysia, submitted before the third
meeting, had a section titled “Domestic regulation (prudential
regulation).”185 Under this section the prudential carve-out clause

Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance,
Communication from the European Communities, art. 13.1, MTN.GNS/FIN/W/1 (July
10, 1990), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100245.pdf
(emphasis added).
181 Working
Group on Financial Service Including Insurance,
Communication from the United States, p. 2, MTN.GNS/FIN/W2, (July 12, 1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100258.pdf
(emphasis
added).
182 Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, Note on the
Meeting of 12-13 July 1990, ¶ 46, MTN/GNS/FIN/2 (Aug. 10, 1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110082.pdf
(emphasis
added) [hereinafter Second Meeting] (The informal paper could not be located.).
183 Second Meeting, supra note 182, ¶ 37.
184 Second Meeting, supra note 182, ¶ 56.
185 Working
Group on Financial Service Including Insurance,
Communication of the Delegation of Malaysia, p.6, MTN.GNS/FIN/W/3 (Sept. 12,
1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110111.pdf
[hereinafter Communication from Malaysia] (Malaysian proposal was made on behalf
180
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would have the broadest scope of the three formal propositions at
the time:
Compliance of the MFTS [Multilateral Framework on
Trade in Services] and sectoral annotations on
financial services should not impinge on a supervisory
authority’s right to: (a) Exercise adequate and proper
supervision over the foreign financial institutions
operating in its country; (b) Implement rules and
regulations to ensure that foreign financial institutions
maintain sound and prudent practices and policies; (c)
Take necessary action for the protection of depositors and
investors; and (d) Allow flexibility to governments to
impose measures for maintenance of stability in the
financial system.186
During the third meeting of the Working Group, when
discussing this proposal, the representative of Japan stated that the
concept of prudential measures might differ from country to
country.187
After these three meetings and three proposals, the Chairman
of the Ad Hoc Working Group to the Group of Negotiations on
Services proposed the following change:
The “measures” referred to in Article XIV:1 [General
Exceptions] of the Agreement shall include reasonable
measures taken for prudential reasons to assure the
protection of investors, depositors, policyholders or
persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a

South East Asian Central Banks [SEACEN] Countries of Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Myanmar.).
186 Id. at 6-7.
187 Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, Note on the
Meeting of 13-15 September 1990, ¶ 22, MTN/GNS/FIN/3 (Oct. 16, 1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110180.pdf
[hereinafter
Third Meeting].
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financial service provider, or to ensure the integrity
and stability of a party’s financial system.188
By the end of 1990 at the Ministerial Conference held in
Brussels, two versions of an annex on financial services were
proposed.189 The prudential carve-out clause of the version
submitted by Canada, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland was identical to
the Ad Hoc Working Groups Chairman’s proposal quoted above.190
The second proposal made on behalf of the SEACEN Countries
contained similar language with two key differences with respect to
the prudential carve-out clause: first, the word “reasonable” was
omitted, and second, measures for prudential reasons were not
subject to the dispute settlement.191
The negotiations work on the future Annex on Financial
Services continued through 1991 under the auspices of the Group of
Negotiations in Services.192 Canada, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland
presented an addendum to their proposal at the Ministerial
Conference in Brussels which added:
[M]easures shall not be applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
(a) restriction on the provision of financial services by
financial service providers of another Party or (b)
discrimination between domestic and foreign financial
service providers or between countries.193

Report by the Chairman of the Sectoral Ad Hoc Working Group to the GNS,
p. 10, MTN.GNS/W/110 (Nov. 6, 1990) [emphasis added], available at
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110245.pdf.
189 DELIMATSIS & HERGER, supra note 175, at 281 [footnote omitted].
190 See Trade Negotiations Committee, Communication from Canada, Japan,
Sweden
and
Switzerland,
MTN.TNC/W/50
(Dec.
2,
1990),
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92120056.pdf.
191 See Trade Negotiations Committee, Communication from Malaysia, p. 2,
MTN.TNC/W/52
(Dec.
4,
1990),
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/.%5CUR%5CTNC%5CW52.
192 DELIMATSIS & HERGER, supra note 175, at 282.
193 Trade Negotiations Committee, Communication from Canada, Japan,
Sweden and Switzerland, p. 4, MTN/TNC/W/50/Add.2 (Oct. 15, 1991),
188
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Based on these submitted proposals, negotiations led to the
current text of the prudential carve-out clause.194
Comparison of the negotiated and final versions of the text
and comments made by the negotiators provides guidance for the
interpretation of the clause. First, the negotiators considered the
option for defining or listing all prudential actions which would be
permitted, but did not. Instead the clause is written in terms of
prudential reasons; thus, leaving greater deference to the CountryMembers in implementing measures. This confirms the finding in
the Panel Report that the reasons must be prudential and not the
measures.
Second, the comparison of the latest two formal proposals
shows that there was likely a compromise among countries whose
positions were to have: a “reasonable” measures requirement, exclude
from the exception particular ways in which measures could be
applied—which is most similar to the second sentence of the current
text, and to make the prudential carve-out clause subject to the WTO
dispute settlement process.
However, none of these observations speak directly as to
what “prudential” means. There was one comment that may help
understanding what “prudential” reasons are: “Reasons other than
prudential ones . . . most often represent the kind of reasons that the
agreement would seek to curtail.”195 Also, negotiators did not
consider using the word “safeguard” which is the more common
word used throughout the WTO Agreements used for identifying
“preventative” measures.
B. Second Sentence of the Prudential Carve-out Clause
If the measure falls within the scope of the Annex, the
Country-Member identifies a reason that is prudential, and the
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/.%5CUR%5CTNC%5CW50A2.PDF [emphasis
added].
194 See generally DELIMATSIS & HERGER, supra note 175, at 282 (“Formal
records contain very little – if any – information about the negotiations that
followed these submissions.”).
195 Second Meeting, supra note 182, ¶ 37.
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measure was implemented “for” that reason, as analyzed by the panel
report, can anything else hinder the application of the prudential
exception provision? The answer “No” would render the second
sentence of the provision meaningless; thus, the answer is necessarily
“Yes, because of the second sentence of the provision.” Basically, the
second sentence would disqualify an otherwise qualified exception.
The Panel Report did not attempt to interpret the second sentence of
the clause which states: “Where such measures do not conform with
the provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of
avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations under the
Agreement.”196 The first part of the sentence necessarily presumes
that there may be measures for prudential reasons conforming to the
agreement, which may be permitted to be used as means of avoiding
the Member’s commitments. The second part’s “means of avoiding”
is what future WTO panels or the Appellate Body may need to
interpret.
Recall that a proposal of a provision with a sentence similar
to the final text appeared as:
[M]easures shall not be applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable (a)
restriction on the provision of financial services by
financial service providers of another Party or (b)
discrimination between domestic and foreign financial
service providers or between countries.197
If a panel finds that “means of avoiding” requires
determining the intentions of a Member in order to weed out
disguised discriminatory measures, then such intent may be discerned
from the objective structure of the regulatory measure.198

GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services, § 2.a.
See Communication from Canada, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland, supra note
193; see also discussion supra Part IV.A.5.
198 See, e.g., Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117.
196
197
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VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, to answer the question of what is and what is
not a prudential reason, generally a fact intensive multi-layered
inquiry is required. Dictionary definitions are vague and do not
provide any definitions for “prudential” that are any more helpful
than if the drafters would write “measures for good reasons.” Context
of the clause is very helpful in providing two main categories of
reasons that are prudential: (1) “protection of investors, depositors,
policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a
financial service supplier”, and (2) “to ensure the integrity and
stability of the financial system.”199 Further, context of the entire
GATS Agreement shows that a “prudential” reason cannot be: “any”
reason, because that would render the word “prudential”
meaningless; merely “preventative” or “precautionary” reason,
because all and any reasons either prevent or are precautionary
against some event; and any of the reasons that have specific
exemption provisions in the GATS, because that would render those
exemption provisions meaningless. Moreover, negotiators did not
consider using the term “safeguarding reasons,” utilizing the
commonly used word “safeguard” to convey something
“preventative” or “precautionary” as used throughout various WTO
agreements; thus, another reason to conclude that “prudential” does
not mean “preventative” or “precautionary.”
Two main objects and purposes of WTO agreements related
to this provision are: recognition of national policy objectives and
progressive liberalization of international trade. If a reason for a
measure does not go against the objective of liberalized trade in
services or goods, then the remaining object and purpose to be
considered is the national policy objective, providing broader
discretion to the implementing Country-Member.
The current interpretation of the prudential carve-out clause
in the Panel Report gives more discretion to Country-Members, as
some have anticipated, by finding that reasons and not measures
must be prudential. However, such discretion is not unqualified even
under the current interpretation. If the “reasonableness” requirement
199

See GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services, § 2.
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was negotiated away during the Uruguay Round, and in return the
clause was made subject to the WTO dispute settlement process,
ironically, “rationality” made its way back into the text through
panel’s interpretation of the word “for” when it was left to, as critics
would say, the “runaway jurists.”
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